From the history of the Normandy liner. The death of the Normandy - Disasters on the water
Part 1:
Description of the ship and tragedy.
In February 1930, rumors spread among shipowners that France intended to build a superliner of grandiose proportions. It was supposed to be the first airliner to be more than 300 meters long and have a gross tonnage of more than 6,000 gross register tons. In 1931, “from authoritative sources” information was received that the T-6 (the conventional name of the French airliner) would have three pipes of unprecedented height.
The Normandie was built in France, launched in 1932 and commissioned in 1935. With a total capacity of 83,420 tons, she was considered the pride of the French fleet and claimed to be the largest, fastest and best ship in the world. Her main dimensions were: length - 314 m, width - 35.9 m, average draft - 11.2 m, side height to the promenade deck - 28 m. Number of decks - 11, of which 7 are solid. Her turbine-electric units with a total capacity of 160,000 liters .hp on four shafts could develop a speed of about 30 knots.In addition to the crew of 1345 people (according to other sources - 1285), the liner could take 1972 passengers on board.
During the design and construction of the Normandy, special attention was paid to ensuring its fire safety. At the same time, fire safety measures were taken and incorporated into the project after a series of experiments and studies. 13,500 hours were spent on this work, 435 different tests were carried out, and the total area of test panels was equal to 1075 sq. m. It must be said that the hull of the famous liner was designed by the Russian emigrant engineer Vladimir Ivanovich Yurkevich (1885-1964), the engines were created according to the design of the Russian engineer Artseulov, and the propellers were created according to the drawings of engineer Kharkovich.
1 Group.- Fire protection bulkheads. With the help of such bulkheads, the entire ship was divided into 4 main fire sections and 126 “primary” ones. The general task of these sections was to localize the fire in small spaces and to ensure the autonomy of the equipment in each of the main sections in the event of a fire. The specification stated that the fire resistance of all isolated boundaries such that it can contain for one hour a fire developing a temperature of 815 ° C, which exceeded the requirements of the International Safety of Life at Sea Convention of 1929.
2 Group.- Use of non-combustible materials. During construction, non-combustible materials such as steel, glass, stone, and marble were widely used. The use of wood was kept to a minimum, and where it was used, strong protection was provided with asbestos and fire-resistant materials (paints).
3 Group.- Protection of electrical equipment and ventilation. In terms of electrical equipment, complete autonomy was provided for each of the four main fire sections; cables were laid in metal gutters; thermal switches, fuses, and a number of other measures were used to protect the electrical network. Mechanical ventilation was also provided for autonomously in each of the main fire sections, and ventilation ducts, as a rule, were not laid through the main and fire bulkheads.
4 Group.- Notification system. It included: a) for all common areas in residential premises - signaling equipment, additional telephones and manual fire signals; b) for cabins - automatic detectors (total 1075 pieces); c) for holds, twin-decks, storerooms - a system of smoke alarm devices (giving light and sound signals about the presence of smoke in the premises), and d) a central fire station - for centralizing all signals from patrols (43 people) and automatic installations, equipped with special telephone communications (for 120 lines), not connected to the general ship telephone system.
5 Group.- Fire extinguishing equipment. a) water for the entire vessel with a pressure of 10 kgf/sq cm and three electric pumps with a supply of 300 t/h, and such a number of hose connections were provided that two powerful jets of water could be used in any part of the vessel after closing all watertight doors and fire extinguishing closures; b) carbon dioxide installations for holds, tween-decks and storerooms, with the gas supply provided to ensure saturation of the largest room with gas in less than 2 minutes; c) carbon dioxide foam for extinguishing fuel fires in engine and boiler rooms and d) portable liquid fire extinguishers.
6 Group.- Devices for evacuation of passengers. These include rotating portholes, which can be opened to allow escape from the cabin if all other exits are cut off; luminous colors and a number of others.
The fire protection of the Normandy was at one time considered a model for ships of its class, and this allowed some fairly prominent foreign experts to declare that “the possibility of a fire on this ship is unlikely.” From the description of the fire and its consequences it will be clear to what extent such forecasts corresponded to the truth. So, the Normandy was transferred to the US Navy on December 24, 1941 and renamed Lafayette, receiving the rank of troop transport. Re-equipment work began immediately, which was carried out quite energetically, so that in early February 1942, that is, less than two months later, it was nearing completion. During this time, housing and dining rooms for 10,000 people were equipped, anti-aircraft weapons were installed, ammunition cellars were equipped, and additional installations for fresh water were provided. The work was carried out on Lake Hudson at pier No. 88. The Lafayette was repainted in spherical color. On February 9, 1942, on the day of the accident, there were more than 3,000 people on board the Lafayette, 500 of them were supposed to be the crew of the ship. They were not familiar with the ship's location and had not received any emergency training. The 50 unskilled workers allocated by the company that converted the ship to perform fire service on the ship also did not have any special fire safety training. There were still 4 junior officers and 36 US Coast Guard sailors on board the ship, whose duties in the event were not clearly defined, although they were on fire patrol duty. These people made up the fire patrol; Some of them were at posts, while others were conducting fire-fighting exercises and exercises. Under the terms of the contract, the company responsible for the conversion was obliged, under threat of fine, to “exercise the highest degree of care to protect the ship from fires.” The contractor was responsible for the operation of the ship’s fire-fighting equipment. But he limited himself to connecting four lines of hoses from hydrants to berth No. 88 to the fixed fire main pipes of the bow and stern ends on the starboard side. One very significant "detail" significantly reduced the ability to use the ship's fire fighting equipment. The fact is that the French type connections did not fit the American standards used by the New York fire department This significantly affected the progress of the fire extinguishing. The conversion of hydrant connections and hoses to the American standard was postponed from day to day and, although there were only a few days left before the ship was delivered, this work was far from completed. This was the case with fire safety training of people and the readiness of fire extinguishing agents on the ship at the time of the accident. But what were the circumstances that led to the fire, and how was it extinguished? On that day, there were 110 gas burners and welding machines operating in various parts of the ship. In the central salon (30x26 m) a group of workers with oxygen-acetylene apparatus consisting of 9 people worked, who had to cut 4 pillar columns. Another group of workers was laying linoleum in the salon. There were 2 more firefighters on duty in the room. Stacked in the cabin were 1,140 boxes of kapok life jackets, which were intended for distribution on the ship. By the time work began, the vests had not been removed from the room: they were piled up around the columns and between them. The room did not even have basic fire safety equipment. The 37mm hose located there was not connected to the hydrate and could therefore not be used immediately. The firefighters on duty had at their disposal two ordinary buckets of water, asbestos boards 0.6x0.9 m and a semicircular metal shield 0.9 m high. In the first half of the day, two columns were cut off. After a break for lunch, we started work again and the third column was also cut down safely. All that remained was to cut off the last column. At this moment, the regular firefighters left the salon, and their duties began to be “performed” by one worker, who held an asbestos board over a metal shield so that sparks would not fall on the vests nearby. When the fourth column was almost cut and had to be carefully laid on the deck , this worker left the shield on the deck to help the others.Now it remains to cut off the last piece of the column.
The foreman, who believed that the job was done, was about to leave his workplace. It was in the last seconds that the workers saw small flashes in the boxes with vests, which were closest to the gas apparatus. It was at 14:35. This is how the biggest accident began. At first they tried to put out the flames with their hands, but the fire spread quickly and they failed. Then they began to use buckets of water and hand-held fire extinguishers, but this was also unsuccessful. Next, a line of hoses was connected from the upper deck, but there was no pressure - the fire continued to spread throughout the ship. Since communications on the ship were almost non-existent, a general alarm could not be announced from the bridge. The fire patrol, temporarily stationed on one of the decks, had no telephone connection with the central fire station. The report of the fire was therefore sent via messengers - resulting in a significant delay in the arrival of regular firefighters at the site of the fire. By this time, not only the salon was burning, but also the adjacent rooms, which were heavily shrouded in smoke.
Fighting the fire was also made more difficult by the fact that someone had turned off all the electric lights to protect the ship from a short circuit. No one was ready to take responsibility for leading the fight against the fire. The Navy representatives on board the ship considered themselves either controllers, consultants, or, finally, responsible for supplying the ship. The commander of the coast guard unit was waiting for action from the port commander, and he believed that the appointed officer was already in command on the ship.
Thus, at such a crucial and threatening moment for the ship, no one was in charge of fighting the fire. The call to the New York City fire brigade was also late, arriving at the ship only at 2:50 p.m. Another problem was that smoke from the upper deck and other high-lying decks began to enter the ship's engine room, forcing the mechanics to close and abandon the engine room. This was around 3 p.m., that is, less than half an hour after the fire started. By this time, the three upper decks were engulfed in flames and unlimited quantities of water were needed to fight the fire. Water was supplied without taking into account the condition of the ship and, above all, its stability.
Large forces were mobilized to extinguish the fire: 24 pumping stations, 6 trucks with ladders, 3 fire boats, a number of tugboats and other means. During the fire, only 3 fire boats pumped about 3,500 tons of water onto the ship. Water was supplied mainly to the upper parts of the ship, and therefore there was a gradual but increasing decrease in the stability of the ship. According to the results of an experimental inclination carried out just shortly before the fire, the initial transverse metacentric height of the ship was determined to be 0.28 m. As a result of filling the upper parts of the ship, the initial stability soon became negative and the ship began to roll to the left side.
As water was added, the list gradually increased, and by 18:30 it reached 10°. By this time the fire was under control. Now the problem arose of leveling the ship, or at least preventing it from tilting even more. Further calculations showed that with a roll of 13°, the openings of the side cargo hatches begin to enter the water, then the portholes. But since many of the windows were open to allow fresh air to enter, and some of the cargo hatches were also not closed, after the ship rolled by 10°, the height of the watertight freeboard turned out to be dangerously small for it.
Naval authorities made some attempts to prevent the ship from capsizing. Measures taken to pump water from the upper parts of the hull were unsuccessful. An attempt to flood the engine room in order to lower the ship's center of gravity also did not achieve its goal, since there were no kingstons on the ship, and it was not possible to penetrate the engine room due to the smoke. Other attempts have been to fill the starboard bottom compartments using holes drilled from the outside, with only partial effect. The roll was reduced by a few degrees, but only for a short time. There was no attempt to drain water overboard or into the rooms below: there were no drainage or scupper systems. And this measure in the current circumstances would, apparently, be one of the most effective.
By 21:30, that is, 7 hours after the start of the fire, the list reached 17°, and the ship remained in this position for several hours, as the ship touched the ground with its chine. But the rising tide began to lift the ship, which broke away from the ground and continued to heel.
By midnight the roll was 30°. Soon the ship was abandoned by the remaining people and lay on the left side, not completely sinking only because the depth of the water (about 15 m) was less than even its half-width. At the same time, its bow ended up on rocky ground, and its stern was immersed in silt. The Lafayette lay on the ground with a list of 80°, and its entire right half was under water.
"Lafayette" closed the approach to two important piers, between which it lay. To clear the piers, work soon began on raising the ship, which turned out to be quite lengthy. Special models were made for the rational conduct of ship-lifting work. The ship was raised only in 1943, however, it was not repaired because they could not find a use for it. After the war, in 1946, Lafayette was sold for scrap.
It is curious that the construction of the Normandy cost the French $65 million. And this was noticeable, because the passengers on the ship were surrounded by unimaginable luxury and comfort: the ship had tennis courts, a real garden with songbirds, a shopping center with department stores, a theater with 400 seats and even a Catholic church. And in one of the huge chimneys there was a special room with enclosures for the dogs of first class passengers, who were taken for a walk on a special deck. All this, as well as the extraordinary richness of the interior and exterior decoration, made the Normandy the most the most expensive ocean liner in the world, because it must be added that the cost of converting the liner into a military transport was $20 million, and the cost of raising it was $9 million.The ship was sold for $160 thousand.
This was the end of the “beauty and pride” of the French fleet.
The following lessons were learned from the Lafayette-Normandie fire:
1. welding and cutting on a ship should not be allowed until all flammable objects are removed to a safe distance or, at least, they are sufficiently protected to prevent them from igniting during hot work;
2. when a ship is in a port, especially when re-equipment work is being carried out on it, the availability of fire-fighting equipment must be ensured, powerful enough to fight fire and always ready for action. In particular, it is very important to ensure standardization of hose connections when a ship is in a foreign port;
3. during the re-equipment of the ship, clarity must be provided regarding the organization of fire fighting, especially when appointing responsible persons and managing fire fighting actions on the ship;
4. the ship must have a special and well-trained fire brigade, necessary both for preventive purposes and for qualified fire fighting;
5. on the converted ship there must be continuous and precise control over the conduct of hot work;
6. any converted ship must be equipped with the necessary and reliable means of communication, warning and signaling;
7. do not allow smoke from a fire on the upper decks to penetrate into the engine rooms (boiler rooms), for which skylights, etc. these spaces should be closed immediately upon the outbreak of fire on the upper decks and all suction fans leading into these spaces should be stopped;
8. Firefighters must use water for fire extinguishing exclusively sparingly, bearing in mind the danger of excessive filling of the ship with water and the possibility of loss of stability;
9. in order to reduce the threat of the ship capsizing when extinguishing fires, systems must be provided to remove “fire” water from it;
10. All fire doors around a fire should be closed as soon as a fire occurs, and doors should only be opened to serve the minimal needs of the groups fighting the fire.
These conclusions, drawn on the basis of the experience of a fire that essentially occurred on a merchant ship, apparently, for the most part, are also true in relation to warships.
From the experience of the fire at Lafayette-Normadie, one more “lesson of lessons” can be learned, which is as follows. It is not enough to include a high technical level of fire safety in the design of a ship; it is not enough to even implement it during construction. To truly ensure fire safety on a ship, it is necessary: compliance with the rules, constant readiness of available fire-fighting technical equipment for action, excellent knowledge by the personnel of their ship - its basic qualities, equipment and location of premises, preparedness and readiness of the crew to fight fire.
Relatively shortly before the Lafayette disaster, ships were lost under similar circumstances. For example, in December 1931, in Newport News (Virginia, USA), as a result of extinguishing a fire, the English cargo and passenger steamer Segovia (9500) capsized near the outfitting embankment. T). The flooding of the upper parts of the ship caused it to lose lateral stability, and it lay at the wall with an 80° list to starboard, without sinking completely due to the relatively shallow depth of the water. "Lafayette" thus almost repeated the sad experience of "Segovia" on an enlarged scale. Another example is the French liner Paris (34,570 tons), which, under similar circumstances, sank in Le Havre in April 1939; all the people on board died. These and other examples, unfortunately, were not taken into account by American firefighters, who sank the largest military transport in their own waters, causing significant damage to the military potential of the Allies during the war.
Part 2:
The death of the Normandy: sabotage or negligence?
The absurd death of the Normandy still conceals many mysteries and continues to attract the attention of historians and specialists. The cause of the fire has not yet been clarified, but some facts indicate sabotage by German agents or... American gangsters!
FORCED PARKING
On September 1, 1939, the Normandie was supposed to leave New York for Le Havre. But going to sea did not take place: on August 30, by order of President Franklin Roosevelt, German, French and even English ships were detained in US ports and subjected to thorough inspection.
We must be sure that no ship leaves port with weapons on board, port officials told stunned captains.
Later the meaning of this action became clear. Intending to officially maintain neutrality, the US government secretly supported Great Britain and France and, in anticipation of future events, under all sorts of pretexts, detained the German liner Bremen in the New York port until the approach of British warships. And when the Bremen finally went to sea on August 31, the Royal Navy cruiser Berwick immediately rushed after it. And the next day Germany attacked Poland and World War II began.
Although Britain and France officially declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, they were in no hurry to engage in active hostilities. While the nine-month “Phantom War” dragged on in Western Europe, 14 French ships, including the Normandie, continued to remain in US ports. Most of the crews were written off from them, and only the minimum crew necessary to maintain the systems and mechanisms of the ships in working order remained on board. The defeat of France during the 1940 campaign and the signing of an armistice by the government of Marshal Petain did not affect the fate of these ships.
Strange events occurred on May 15, 1941. On this day the coastal
the guards simultaneously occupied all the French ships and placed them on
armed guards, supposedly to protect against possible sabotage. Simultaneously with this act, articles began to appear in the American press that openly discussed the possibility of converting the Normandy into an aircraft carrier or troop transport. And the popular Life magazine even published a diagram of the Normandy, converted into an airborne landing ship. “In this form, the Normandy will be able to carry 40 cover aircraft and 10 thousand soldiers. Part of her flight deck - the longest in the world - can be reserved for marching and shooting training,” the magazine wrote categorically.
The New York Herald Tribune of July 16, 1941 shed light on these strange events. “Officials in Washington believe that the Normandy is too valuable a vessel to sit idle, and that the US government badly needs it and is ready to buy it. These individuals also stated that the United States had long wanted to take possession of the Normandy, but did not dare to do so for fear of worsening relations with France,” the newspaper wrote in an editorial.
And six months later, America simply took the liner for itself; on December 12, 1941, American sailors occupied the Normandy without any explanation, unceremoniously expelling the remnants of the French crew from it. And on December 16, the ship, confiscated by the American government, was officially introduced into the US Navy.
Having renamed the Normandie the Lafayette, the military began converting the liner into a military transport. In February 1942, the re-equipment work was basically completed, and on the 15th the transport-landing ship was supposed to go to sea.....but there was a fire. (this is written above). Correspondents from New York newspapers appeared near the burning ship before agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Their reports from the scene of the accident allowed them to accurately reproduce the sequence of events. They reported that the death of the Normandy was observed by its creator, the Russian shipbuilding engineer Yurkevich, and its former captain Punie. Both of them were constantly on the pier until the very end and witnessed his tragic and inglorious death - the only case in the entire history of shipping. “It felt like my heart was breaking in my chest,” Yurkevich later recalled. Captain Punier immediately called several experienced bilge operators from the team, who knew the bowels of the Normandy like the back of their hand, to the scene. They all immediately offered their services to Admiral Andrews, but he arrogantly rejected help: “Our rescuers and firefighters know their job no worse than the French!” And at a press conference held in the evening, the admiral told reporters about the alleged cause of the accident and confidently stated: “There is no suspicion of sabotage!”
The next day, Yurkevich also held a press conference in his office, at which he explained the main technical reasons for the death of the Normandy, which had recently been presented as an unsinkable ship, and gave clear answers to journalists’ questions. His statement indirectly confirmed the official version of the cause of the tragedy, and the New York Herald Tribune newspaper on February 11, 1942 made the statement: “Negligence played into the hands of the enemy as effectively as sabotage.” And two months later, the Senate Committee on the Navy released the findings of its commission. “The causes and consequences of the fire are the result of carelessness on the part of the Navy,” the report said. According to the US Senate, responsibility for the disaster lay entirely with the leadership of the country's navy. It would seem that we can put an end to this, but...
Investigation of the tragedy.
The official investigation conducted by the American authorities did not establish the exact cause of the fire on the Normandy. The opinions of Navy and FBI experts on this issue differed. The first assumed that the fire started accidentally, from a spark that fell on a pile of kapok life belts. The second attributed the fire to sabotage by intelligence agents of Nazi Germany. The authors of the book “Sabotage: The Secret War against America” - American journalists Michael Sayers and Albert Kann - came to the same conclusion. In the first edition of this book, published in the fall of 1942, they write: “The FBI knew that Nazi agents had been secretly monitoring for a long time"Normandy". Two weeks before the fall of France, June 8, 1940,
The German secret service sent a coded shortwave radio message to its agents in the United States. This message, transmitted from Hamburg, was intercepted by a radio station in Centerport on Long Island, decrypted and read: “Thank you for the messages. Watch the Normandy. Following the instructions received, German spies began to closely monitor the Normandy. German spy Kurt Frederick Ludwig sent regular reports to his superiors, written in sympathetic ink. Some of them were intercepted. Here is one of them, sent on April 15, 1941: The Normandy is still at Pier 88 North (88th Street North). Ludwig regularly visited the bay embankment to observe the Normandie. The FBI agent tasked with tracking the German spy describes one of Ludwig's walks in his report: “On June 18 (1941), the subject walked from 59th Street to 12th Avenue. He looked at the piers. When the object approached the pier where the Normandy was located at 50th Street, it stopped for a while. He seemed to be carefully studying the ship. Then he walked again, turning back. At 42nd Street, the subject boarded the ferry to Weehawken, went up to the upper deck and continued to examine the Normandy. The FBI agent further reports that upon arriving in Weehawken, Ludwig wrote notes in a small black notebook for 20 minutes.
Considering the cause of the fire to be sabotage by agents of the German
intelligence, Sayers and Kann provide a number of facts in their study,
confirming this version:
1. During the week preceding the fire on February 9, four fires occurred on board the ship, which were extinguished.
2. When the fire started on February 9, there were only two fire buckets near its source.
3. The city fire warning system was turned off on the ship 22 days before the disaster, which was unknown to the US Coast Guard.
4. On board the converted ship there was a certain number of hostile (pro-German) workers, and their personal data was not carefully checked.
5. Any unauthorized persons could easily enter the ship without any permission. All they needed was a badge indicating the name of the contractor or subcontractor for whom they worked.
Instead of a conclusion.
Many years have passed since then. From time to time, articles devoted to the tragic death of the Normandy and recollections of a few eyewitnesses appeared in the maritime historical press. They still included two versions of the cause of the fire: a spark from a gas cutter and sabotage by German intelligence agents. But in January 1975, the authoritative English magazine on the history of the fleet, Notical Magazine, published a sensational report about the cause of the fire.
"Normandy" was burned by the American mafia!
It said the Mafia burned the French liner Normandie in New York Harbor in 1942 because Lucky Luciano wanted to demonstrate to the US Navy the urgent need to protect US East Coast ports. On charges of murder, Luciano was placed in the “Country Club” - a prison in the city of Albany, which bore this name because of the preferential conditions of detention and the comfort of prisoners. He was promised release at the end of the war, provided that his people would assist the authorities, and then he would leave for Europe. The mafia kept its word - throughout the war, not a single act of sabotage was recorded in US ports.
* * *
It is known for certain that during World War II, US Navy intelligence almost openly collaborated with Charles Luciano, who had enormous and unquestioned authority among Italian emigrants and workers of New York. It is also known that Luciano warned the counterintelligence of the US Navy about the impending sabotage and offered his services to prevent them, in order to thereby reduce his prison term. Apparently, the sailors did not heed the gangster’s proposal, and Luciano decided to demonstrate his capabilities to them. It is quite possible that while the leader of the New York mafia was in prison, his people did this without any risk or much trouble.
Bibliography:
1. I.M. Korotkin “Accidents and disasters of ships”, Shipbuilding, Leningrad, 1977, 296 pp. and other sources.
Normandy (ship)
| Normandy (later Lafayette) | ||
|---|---|---|
| Normandie | ||
| basic information | ||
| Type | Transatlantic liner | |
| Affiliation | Compagnie Générale Transatlantique | |
| Shipyard | Chantiers et Atelier de l'Atlantique, Saint-Nazaire | |
| Launched | 29th of October | |
| Put into operation | May 29 | |
| Withdrawn from the fleet | February | |
| Current status | Dismantled for scrap | |
| Options | ||
| Tonnage | 79,280 t (83,423 (1935-1936)) | |
| Length | 314 m (1,028 ft) | |
| Width | 35.7 m (117 ft) | |
| Average draft | 11.26 m | |
| Technical data | ||
| Power point | (((Engines))) | |
| Screws | 4 | |
| Power | 165 thousand l. With. | |
| Speed | 29 knots | |
| Crew | 1,345 | |
| Passenger capacity | 1,972 (848 1st class, 670 tourist class, 454 3rd class) | |
Description of the liner
During the construction of the liner, the largest number of rivets ever used to build a ship was used. Their total number was 12 million. The Normandy's riveted hull was made of high-strength steel using a small amount of electric welding. Eleven watertight bulkheads consumed a total of 6.4 thousand tons of hull steel manufactured at the Siemens-Martin plants in Saarland, out of 30 thousand tons required for the entire hull. Four steam turbines with a capacity of 46.5 thousand liters. With. each at a rotation speed of 2430 rpm was connected to four three-phase generators with a capacity of 33.4 thousand kW at a voltage of 5.5-6.0 kV. For electric propulsion, synchronous motors were used, installed in the stern of the vessel and transmitting a power of 29.4 thousand kW to each propeller shaft at a rotation speed of 238-248 rpm. Twenty-nine water-tube boilers produced superheated steam at a pressure of 28 atm and consumed up to 1.2 thousand tons of fuel oil per day. At the beginning of the year, to reduce strong vibration resulting from a design flaw, all four three-blade propellers (weighing 23 tons each) were replaced with four-blade propellers (weighing 25 tons each) and at the same time the shape of the propeller shaft fillets was changed. This made it possible to completely solve the problem of vibration of the aircraft body. This year, a radar station was installed on the Normandy - the first in the transport fleet. Even the pipes had to emphasize the uniqueness of the ship. Inclined 10° towards the stern to give the impression of speed, they contained the bulk of the ventilation ducts inside. The first two pipes were real and functioning, but the third was fake and was intended for beauty and to evenly distribute air resistance along the entire length of the vessel.
The liner, which had eleven decks, had a special aft end that gave it an elegant look, as well as a 290-meter-long glassed-in promenade deck, which protruded somewhat over the side of the ship. The liner, according to tradition at that time, had a luxurious interior with a total cost of 55 million dollars. The ship had 11 passenger elevators, 22 lifts for cargo and vehicles. On the upper deck there were tennis courts, a bird garden, a store and even a Catholic chapel measuring 5.24 m by 8.23 m and a height of 6.40 m. The main dining salon with 1000 seats had a height of three inter-deck spaces. The ship also housed a theater hall with 380 seats, a twenty-four-meter swimming pool measuring 24.99 m by 5.79 m, a winter garden greenhouse, and a garage for 100 cars. The common galley for all restaurants was 50 m long, 35 m wide, with an electric stove measuring 17 by 2 meters. From the advertising brochures it followed that the Normandy had 847 cabins, 320 cast-iron enameled bathtubs, 480 showers, 1,490 washbasins and other plumbing fixtures necessary for the needs of passengers. Which consumed up to 40 tons of hot, 100 tons of cold and 300 tons of sea water every hour. The restaurant is equipped with 14,570 tablecloths, 226 thousand napkins, 150 thousand towels, 58,860 plates and 28,120 cups and saucers. Passengers used 38 thousand sheets on each flight.
December 1, 1930 at the John Brown shipyard, located in the county of Clydebank, the ceremonial laying of the vessel took place "Queen Mary"- one of the most grandiose passenger ships. For this significant date, we have prepared a review of the most interesting ships that have left their mark on the history of shipbuilding.
Royal William
Royal William was one of the first passenger ships to cross the Atlantic Ocean. She was launched on April 27, 1831 in Quebec. The ship sailed between Quebec and the Atlantic colonies several times until the route was closed due to a cholera epidemic in 1832. Royal William was later sold to the Spanish Navy, where she served for quite a long time.
Great Eastern
Great Eastern (Leviathan) was launched in 1858. The 211-meter steamer was considered the largest ship until 1899. It reached a speed of 14 knots, had a displacement of 32,000 tons, and its engines produced a power of 8,000 hp. From 1864 the ship was converted into a transatlantic cable layer, and in 1888 it was sold for scrap for £16,000.
Servia
The world's first steel liner, Servia, made its maiden voyage in 1881. Due to some innovative technologies (such as electric lighting), many historians call it the first "modern" airliner. The 10,300-horsepower ship reached a speed of 17 knots. The designers focused specifically on passenger transportation, reducing the volume of the cargo compartment and offering customers incredibly comfortable conditions for staying on board the ship. In 1902, the ship was removed due to breakdown.
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse
The first four-funnel liner, Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, was launched on May 4, 1897. It marked the beginning of an era of new, more modern and powerful passenger ships. The liner won the Atlantic Blue Riband for the first time for Germany for the fastest voyage from Europe to America. During the First World War she was converted into a warship. Kaiser Wilhelm was sunk in 1914.
Titanic
The legendary liner Titanic was launched on April 10, 1912. It reached a maximum speed of 24 knots. The displacement of the 269-meter giant was 52 thousand tons. However, the fate of the liner was tragically cut short on its first voyage: the Titanic sank on April 14 after colliding with an iceberg.
Normandie
The transatlantic liner Normandie began its maiden voyage on May 29, 1935. The ship, which displaced 71,000 tons, is still considered the most powerful turbo-electric ship ever built. Thanks to its innovative hull design, exquisite interior and impressive technical characteristics, many experts recognized it as the best airliner. On February 9, 1942, the liner caught fire from a spark in one of the cabins. It was later sold for scrap.
Queen Mary
On September 26, 1934, the legendary Queen Mary liner was launched. However, only 18 months later the 160,000-horsepower car set off on its first voyage. The liner crossed the Atlantic in 3 days 23 hours 57 minutes with an average speed of 30.63 knots, and on one of its subsequent voyages won the Blue Ribbon of the Atlantic. On March 1, 1940, the order was given to prepare the liner for military service. After the war, it returned to the transatlantic route, but was not nearly as profitable. On December 10, 1967, the liner took its place in Long Beach Harbor and is now a museum.
Voyager of the Seas
The cruise ship Voyager of the Seas is often called a "floating hotel" because of the amount of entertainment it can offer to its customers: cabins to suit every taste, shops, restaurants, sports fields, a climbing wall, an ice skating rink and much more. It is 311 meters long, has a power of 75.6 MW, a speed of 22 knots, and a maximum capacity of 3,840 passengers.
Queen Mary 2
In 2003, the Queen Mary 2 became the largest liner in the world. The 17-deck vehicle is capable of speeds of up to 30 knots and can accommodate 2,620 passengers. In tribute to modern standards, the ship is equipped with a huge number of shops, restaurants and entertainment centers.
Allure of the Seas
Allure of the Seas, which set off on its first voyage three years ago on December 1, 2010, is still the largest cruise ship. It offers its 6,296 passengers an incredible variety of services, including a theatre, carousels and an ice skating rink. The liner is equipped with folding (telescopic) pipes that allow it to pass under low bridges. The average speed of the car reaches 27 knots. A reliable security system has already shown its best side several times, successfully extinguishing small fires.
In the early 1930s, the French shipping company Compagnie Générale Transatlantique set out to build a flagship transatlantic liner that would allow it to compete with the British giants Cunard Line and White Line, then considered leaders in the shipping industry.
The design of the Russian engineer Vladimir Yurkevich was taken as a basis, who proposed a hull design that had hydrodynamic qualities unprecedented by the standards of that time. Already in January 1931, the first work on the construction of the vessel began, and in the spring of 1935, its trial sea trials were carried out.
Soon the liner, named "Normandy", set off on its first voyage along the Le Havre - New York line and, as a result, immediately became the owner of the prestigious Blue Riband award, setting a new speed record for crossing the North Atlantic: 4 days, 3 hours and 25 minutes .
Over the following years, the ship, which was secretly considered one of the most luxurious ships of its time, continued to make successful voyages - until August 31, 1939: due to the military threat looming over Europe, the liner was anchored in the port of New York.
A year later, when it became known about the surrender of France to Nazi Germany, the Normandy was arrested by the American Coast Guard, and in December 1941, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it was accepted into the US Navy. The authorities ordered to give the liner a new name - "Lafayette" - and convert it into a transport vessel.
The liner, named "Normandy", set off on its first voyage along the Le Havre - New York line and, as a result, immediately became the owner of the prestigious Blue Riband award, setting a new record for the speed of crossing the North Atlantic: 4 days, 3 hours and 25 minutes.
During the repair work, which lasted several months, a mistake occurred that became fatal in the history of the legendary ship: on February 9, 1942, one of the workers who was cutting the bulkheads of the ship accidentally set fire to a pile of life jackets lying nearby. The fire suppression system was turned off and the Normandy caught fire.
Although New York firefighters arrived on the scene within 12 minutes, they were not able to begin extinguishing the fire right away: due to the many workers rushing to leave the ship, they simply could not get on board.
After the fire was finally extinguished, it turned out that the water poured onto the boat deck began to accumulate on one side, which caused a dangerous list. By nightfall, the Normandy capsized on its left side and remained lying at the pier at an angle of 79 degrees.
It was only in 1943 that the ship was leveled and put back on the water: to do this, specialists had to cut off all the pipes, masts and superstructures of the liner. As a result, it was towed down the Hudson and abandoned until further decisions could be made.
At first, they planned to turn the Normandy into an aircraft carrier, then again convert it into a passenger liner, but after assessing the cost, these ideas were abandoned. In October 1946, the ship was sold to Lipsett Inc. for $160 thousand, and its interior items were exhibited at various auctions for a long time.